Shít graphs

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briantrumpet

briantrumpet

Timewaster
But there is no clickbait to be had from that.

And it's from a rather different agenda: the first graph seems to be designed to scare.
 

PurplePenguin

Über Member
For those of you with a better grasp of finance than me, is Portes' criticism of the FT graph quoted in this thread fair? He thinks it's a shît graph.

https://skywriter.blue/@jdportes.bsky.social/3mzb7relcq22v

This is a challenging post for me. As you are no doubt aware, I think the FT's graphing ability is rarely any good. It is, perhaps, the inspiration for this thread. The problem arises though because I also dislike Jonathan Portes (for reasons I can't recall, but probably due to inaccurate Brexit reporting). Therefore, I'd like both sides to lose this debate.

Consistent with FT standards, the graph is poor. Only adjusting for inflation when looking at a period of 75 years is a bit meaningless. As has been pointed out, the population has changed and the economy has grown.

Jonathan Portes's reaction is over the top though. He's a professor picking on a journalist. It's not an academic publication, it's the FT. If he's going to get that enraged by this, he would be unable to read any anything.

So, in conclusion, they're both wrong.

Separately, whilst trying to remind myself what I dislike about Jonathan Portes, I stumbled across the £1,000 bet he lost. It's a good example of where economists so often get it wrong (I'll see if I can the winner's post on the subject).
 
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OP
OP
briantrumpet

briantrumpet

Timewaster
This is a challenging post for me. As you are no doubt aware, I think the FT's graphing ability is rarely any good. It is, perhaps, the inspiration for this thread. The problem arises though because I also dislike Jonathan Portes (for reasons I can't recall, but probably due to inaccurate Brexit reporting). Therefore, I'd like both sides to lose this debate.

Consistent with FT standards, the graph is poor. Only adjusting for inflation when looking at a period of 75 years is a bit meaningless. As has been pointed out, the population has changed and the economy has grown.

Jonathan Portes's reaction is over the top though. He's a professor picking on a journalist. It's not an academic publication, it's the FT. If he's going to get that enraged by this, he would be unable to read any anything.

So, in conclusion, they're both wrong.

Separately, whilst trying to remind myself whilst I dislike about Jonathan Portes, I stumbled across the £1,000 bet he lost. It's a good example of where economists so often get it wrong (I'll see if I can the winner's post on the subject).

Thanks PP.
 

PurplePenguin

Über Member
Chris Snowdon:

When I made the bet with Jonathan Portes in 2018, I remember thinking that I would be a significantly older man by the time it paid off. It is sobering to think about how quickly those five years have passed and how soon the icy hand of Death will be on our shoulder.

Still, it’s the winning that counts. Looking back, my only regret is that I didn’t stipulate that the prize be adjusted for inflation. Thanks to the neo-Keynesian economic policies Professor Portes promotes, £1,000 in 2018 is only worth £828 today.

Forecasts of dramatic increases in poverty and inequality are made all the time. They grab a few headlines before disappearing like tears in the rain. Portes’ prediction that (relative) child poverty would shoot up from 29% to 41.3% per cent by 2021/22 if the government implemented Universal Credit immediately struck me as implausible. The rate of (relative) child poverty (after housing costs) has never exceeded 34% and it hadn’t gone above 30% since 2008, despite endless claims that it was spiralling. After a little negotiation, I agreed to pay him £1,000 if (relative) child poverty exceeded 37% in 2021/22 and he agreed to pay me the same if it didn’t.

To my mind, an increase of this magnitude would require something more drastic than Theresa May’s reforms to the benefits system. If you believe that the Conservative government is determined to grind the poor into the dirt, you will have no problem believing that it would design a system to plunge another 1.5 million children into (relative) poverty. If, however, you think it is run by often hapless but basically centrist politicians whose only unbending principle is that they should be re-elected, you will be more sceptical about this.

The first of these two groups is very large and is particularly vocal on social media. Predictions of imminent doom play well with people who catastrophise everything for a day or two before moving on to something else. If we hadn’t made the bet, everyone would have forgotten about it.

As Portes said at the time, it is important for those who make such forecasts to have skin in the game. He took the bet, which leads me to think that he must have really believed in his prediction. Credit to him for that. But how wrong he was. When the figures for 2021/22 were published recently, they showed that (relative) child poverty (after housing costs) was at 29%, exactly the same as it had been when we made the bet.

childpov2-300x221.png


This humiliating defeat is particularly awkward for Professor Portes as he has spent the last few years telling me that I know nothing and he knows it all. As you can imagine, this is gratifying for me, not least because it wipes out gambling debts racked up during the World Cup in which I was badly let down by Belgium.

To the handful of lemon-suckers who say it is in bad taste to bet on child poverty, I say that we were not betting on child poverty. We were betting on the validity of economic forecasting. Portes’ prediction was a totem for all economic forecasting, most of which is little better than guesswork and should not be taken seriously. For example, in February, just four months after Liz Truss had to be restrained from ‘blowing’ a £30 billion ‘hole’ in the public finances, the Office for Budget Responsibility admitted that tax receipts were £30 billion higher than it had predicted. This, like all its other terrible forecasts, did not stop people hanging on the OBR’s every word.

As a rule of thumb, the greater the political implications of a prediction, the worse the prediction will be. We saw this with the COVID-19 models in 2021 and we see it with economic forecasting all the time. The pessimism – or, more rarely, optimism – of the authors spills over onto the spreadsheet. The reason the COVID-19 models were wrong is the same reason economic models are usually wrong. They are unable to predict how people behave when incentives change.

At least the COVID-19 models were underpinned with some science (such as mortality rates). Macro-economic modelling is based on essentially nothing. There is no way of knowing what GDP growth will be in 2026 and there is no point in guessing. When insights from the ‘science’ of economics are available, they are often ignored. That is how you end up with the Bank of England in May 2021, having printed £895 billion, forecasting that inflation would hover around 2% for the next three years.

Besides, it was Portes, not me, who was banking on (relative) child poverty rising, and relative measures of poverty are not a good way of measuring material deprivation anyway. Notice in the graph above that child poverty dipped between 2008 and 2011, and again in 2020/21. These were, to put it gently, not good years for the economy and they were not good years for the poor. Relative poverty fell because it is measured as the proportion of households living below 60 per cent of the median income. The standard of living did not improve for people on low incomes in those years. All that happened was the median income fell.

What we saw after the financial crisis is what we are seeing now: wages rising below the rate of inflation while benefits, for the most part, are lifted in line with inflation. If you used relative poverty as your guide, you might think things were getting better. In fact, the best most people can hope for is for things to not get much worse.

The same is broadly true of using income inequality as a measure of progress. Like relative poverty, it tends to go down in the bad times and up in the good times. The irony is that there has been plenty to be gloomy about in the last fifteen years. Productivity, gross national income and wages have risen sluggishly and fitfully. The 2010s were not far off being a lost decade and so far the 2020s have been even worse. It has been a good time to be a doom-monger. The problem is that most of the doom-mongers have focused on the two metrics that have not got worse.






 

Ian H

Pharaoh
I think that makes the point very effectively.
 
Does that information really merit graphical presentation at all? All it seems to add is that 209 is quite a lot more than 22, which most people probably know.
 
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briantrumpet

briantrumpet

Timewaster
Does that information really merit graphical presentation at all? All it seems to add is that 209 is quite a lot more than 22, which most people probably know.

I still remember the statement in some BBC programme about 30 years ago that China has one million villages – it's on a different scale.
 
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