Gender again. Sorry!

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monkers

Squire
Given that it would take years - a century even - to eradicate male behaviour that makes women feel unsafe and uncomfortable, excluding men from women's spaces until that happens is a reasonable way of dealing with the current issues. That includes all men because it's not just about safety and all men are equally men.

This is like saying 'We need to eradicate prejudice against the disabled before we make any practical accommodations for them. We can't do both'.

Yes I see. You think women want muscled men with tats and beards in the women's loo. I don't think the trans men will be safe with all those cougars. ^_^

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CXRAndy

Guru
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Yes I see. You think women want muscled men with tats and beards in the women's loo. I don't think the trans men will be safe with all those cougars. ^_^

If any biological man who looked exactly like this says the magic words 'I'm a woman' you think he has every right to be in women's spaces though.

Why don't you advocate for 3rd spaces which are unisex then? How women feel about male looking people in their spaces never bothered you before. We were told to suck it up and that men had every right to be there, no matter how they looked. Your sudden concern for us is very touching.

 

monkers

Squire
Monkers won't do that

That is an admission the fight is over, it's just the terms of surrender agreeing for a third unisex facilit
So you wanted me to stop while you just carry on? Nope, not happening.

The legal fight is not over.

If there was a need for a third toilet in order to keep people safe I'd support it. When you provide the evidence of the need, then we'll talk some more.
 
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Women and girls are more vulnerable in mixed sex spaces than single sex ones. When you allow men into women's spaces you make them mixed sex and increase women's discomfort.

The purpose of 3rd unisex spaces is to accommodate those who do not wish to use the facilities of their own sex. You have to ask why such people refuse unisex facilities or even specialist transgender services. Why do they insist on being in with women? Because it's not about women not needing safety or not feeling uncomfortable, it's about these men's own desires to be in a woman's space - it brings validation and affirmation. Mixed sex spaces and services don't bring that. You only get that by being in a place where only women can go.
 

CXRAndy

Guru
For TiMs

It's the grass is greener in the next field

Forbidden fruit
 

monkers

Squire
On the question of the Supreme Court judgment' let's just go to paragraph 2.

2. It is not the role of the court to adjudicate on the arguments in the public domain on the meaning of gender or sex, nor is it to define the meaning of the word “woman” other than when it is used in the provisions of the EA 2010. It has a more limited role which does not involve making policy. The principal question which the court addresses on this appeal is the meaning of the words which Parliament has used in the EA 2010 in legislating to protect women and members of the trans community against discrimination. Our task is to see if those words can bear a coherent and predictable meaning within the EA 2010 consistently with the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (“the GRA 2004”).

Now let's take that one piece at a time.

2. It is not the role of the court to adjudicate on the arguments in the public domain on the meaning of gender or sex.

Yet this is what is being said by the EHRC; that the court had done just that. Therefore this is contestable.

nor is it to define the meaning of the word “woman” other than when it is used in the provisions of the EA 2010.

The court did not define the meaning of the word ''woman'' or ''man'' or ''biological sex''. They have said that with reference to academic texts concerning how words are used in legal text, there can be just one definition or interpretation, and that it must not rely on context.

The problem with this approach is that the Equality Act was intended to permit intersectionality across the nine protected characteristics. This is not hearsay or theory, it is covered in Section 14 of the Equality Act, and its importance released in a Cabinet release document at that time. The document contained examples of how this would operate on the basis of combined discrimination.

Ministers would have knowledge of the fact. The Cabinet Office would have known from that document that the legislation had been drafted to operate a la carte, and that trans people were therefore protected under sex and gender reassignment.

https://assets.publishing.service.g...2__-_BOOKLET_3__Annex_B__EASY_READ_V2_acc.pdf

The principal question which the court addresses on this appeal is the meaning of the words which Parliament has used in the EA 2010 in legislating to protect women and members of the trans community against discrimination.


The Solicitor General at that time, Vera Baird had chaired the drafting committee meetings. In one exchange with a Dr Harris, the legal principle of combined discrimination was considered. These are covered in Qs 69-77. In the final stage of the writing the legislature there was the examination of the witnesses before signing the Bill off.

Memorandum submitted by Government Equalities Office



Examination of Witnesses



Witnesses: Vera Baird QC MP, Solicitor General, Maria Eagle MP, Minister of State, Government Equalities Office and Mr James Maskell, Treasury Solicitors lawyer in charge of the Equality Bill, gave evidence.



Chairman: Good afternoon everybody and welcome to an oral evidence session of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We are doing a scrutiny session on the Equality Bill and we have been joined by Maria Eagle - Vera Baird I hope is on her way. But as Maria is here and her business is virtually self-contained we thought we might as well start with Maria and Baroness Prashar is going to ask the first questions.

Q69 Dr Harris: Again, we had this debate in Committee on trans people but we need to take it as evidence in this Committee, I am afraid.

Vera Baird: The definitions.

Q70 Dr Harris: You will know the question. This Committee has had evidence from Press for Change and the Equality Network that the definition you are using, which is clearly not merely medical but which defines gender reassignment as the protected characteristic based on people proposing to have, or undergoing, or having undergone, medical gender reassignment, it is not sufficient to capture those people who are subject to discrimination on the basis of their transsexual status who are not proposing to have, or undergoing, or have undergone, gender reassignment. There is a group that are not covered who are being discriminated against.

Vera Baird: And who are they?

Q71 Dr Harris: They are trans people who are not proposing to have gender reassignment, and not necessarily only self-defined, they are people who, for example, manifest different gender identities at different times. The key point is that because they are not proposing to have, or undergoing, or have undergone, gender reassignment they fall outside your definition. The organisations representing those people feel that the definition is therefore too narrow to capture the protection that they want from discrimination. I was wondering whether your objection to widening the definition is either because you disagree, the definition is wide enough to capture those people who are proposing to undergo gender reassignment or, as you have said in previous examples, there is not enough evidence of discrimination against people who are not proposing to undergo gender reassignment.

Vera Baird: We did not get any body of evidence, as you have just said, about discrimination against such people. We are quite open to wanting to protect as many people as we can and what we have done, of course, is to get rid of the whole medical model and turn this into what you can best describe, I think, as a personal process which can be manifested in however the person wishes to manifest their gender reassignment: just proposing it; changing the way they dress; changing their name. That is all it requires to be part of a process. What is difficult to envisage is some freestanding definition of gender identity that is not linked to that process, and I know you tried one in Committee but it did not work. That is the real difficulty. Buttress this definition, which I think is wide, with the availability of protection against discrimination by perception and you may think that we have covered 99.9 per cent of the people who are likely to be discriminated against here.

Q72 Dr Harris: We have just had a very good summary of the debate in Committee, a fair summary as well, and one of the issues raised was the perception has to be of someone considering undergoing gender reassignment.

Vera Baird: Just to make a point: I do not know how fantastically well informed the public is about all of this. It is quite possible that there would be discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, is there not? People may well think that a man who dresses as a woman is gay or a woman who dresses as a man is a lesbian, so there might well be that perception of discrimination as well which, again, ought to widen the ambit of protection.

Q73 Dr Harris: That may be true, but the trans community may well want protection in their own right. I just want to bring in a human rights point here, which is that there is concern that the right to privacy might be infringed by the exemptions that exist from protection for trans people in Schedules 3 and 9, which we have also debated, which exist for organisations to discriminate against them even where a certificate is held. Under the Gender Recognition Act, of course, that requires that people be recognised in their new gender for all purposes. Therefore, one of the questions I have is whether to protect their human rights and be compliant with that law, even if the Equality Bill could write out that one did not have to be compliant, if there was not to be regression how can you allow exceptions on grounds of gender reassignment even where people have a Gender Recognition Certificate? I do not think we raised this in Committee so it is a new human rights based point.

Vera Baird: What are the specific exceptions that you are worried about?

Q74 Dr Harris: For example, in Schedule 9 there is the ability of a religious organisation to discriminate, so they could say, "We will allow a woman priest", that is if they had women priests ---

Vera Baird: There are not many of them.

Q75 Dr Harris: Yes, indeed, but let us say they did, "But we are not going to allow a woman priest who is in possession of a Gender Recognition Certificate, who is a woman". They would argue that is a permitted exception under gender reassignment. Is that a clash with the sex discrimination provisions?

Vera Baird: Is that right? She is a woman now for all purposes, not a transgender person, a woman.

Q76 Dr Harris: Right.

Vera Baird: That is the point of the certificate, is it not, to make it clear beyond doubt and that is where all her rights come from.

Q77 Dr Harris: So what you are saying is someone with a certificate does not fall within the protected ground and, therefore, exceptions on that protected ground ---

Vera Baird: Will fall within the protected ground of sex.

Chairman: I think you have answered the question.

Our task is to see if those words can bear a coherent and predictable meaning within the EA 2010 consistently with the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (“the GRA 2004”).
From the readily available on-line records of the drafting committee meetings and the final examination, it had been put beyond doubt what had been intended with the words of the then Solicitor General herself.

Those words, combined with the testimony of Melanie Field, the lead writer of the Equality Act, the records of the intention of the Act to act as an a la carte approach to the legislation, and the documents pertaining to combined discrimination protection show the intentions of parliament within the legislature and its approach to implementation.

Instead, the Supreme Court adopted the Cardinal Richilieu approach...

Cardinal Richelieu 1585–1642 If you give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him.

Rather than take the above evidence of parliament's intentions, they chose instead to examine academic references to penmanship in academic drafting.

In the process the SC failed also to observe Article 8 of the convention rights - the right to privacy of trans people.

The SC judgment will be tested at the European Court of Human Rights.

The overstepping interpretation of the SC judgment will be tested as an urgent case at the Court of Administration.

It ain't over till it's over.
 
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You skipped paragraph 1 which makes it clear that the ruling is about 'sex' as it pertains to the Equality Act. Nobody has claimed the judgement refers to anything else. We are talking about single sex spaces and services from service providers. Nobody has said you can't have your personal opinion about what sex means and you can define 'woman' however you personally wish, but for service providers re the Equality Act it means biological sex.

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This is just the latest straw grasping.
'Oh dear...It's all too complicated to understand and implement'. It isn't.
 

monkers

Squire
You skipped paragraph 1 which makes it clear that the ruling is about 'sex' as it pertains to the Equality Act. Nobody has claimed the judgement refers to anything else. We are talking about single sex spaces and services from service providers. Nobody has said you can't have your personal opinion about what sex means and you can define 'woman' however you personally wish, but for service providers re the Equality Act it means biological sex.

View attachment 8491


This is just the latest straw grasping.
'Oh dear...It's all too complicated to understand and implement'. It isn't.

I skipped part one because it is not contested that cis women and cis men are protected by the characteristic of sex.

Part 2 is the relevant part as it sets the terms of reference for the court's work.

Anyway take the trouble to read the points I have made. Dame Vera Baird the then Solicitor General in answer to a question from Dr Harris makes clear the purpose of the Bill.


Q72 Dr Harris: We have just had a very good summary of the debate in Committee, a fair summary as well, and one of the issues raised was the perception has to be of someone considering undergoing gender reassignment.
Vera Baird: Just to make a point: I do not know how fantastically well informed the public is about all of this. It is quite possible that there would be discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, is there not? People may well think that a man who dresses as a woman is gay or a woman who dresses as a man is a lesbian, so there might well be that perception of discrimination as well which, again, ought to widen the ambit of protection.
Q73 Dr Harris: That may be true, but the trans community may well want protection in their own right. I just want to bring in a human rights point here, which is that there is concern that the right to privacy might be infringed by the exemptions that exist from protection for trans people in Schedules 3 and 9, which we have also debated, which exist for organisations to discriminate against them even where a certificate is held. Under the Gender Recognition Act, of course, that requires that people be recognised in their new gender for all purposes. Therefore, one of the questions I have is whether to protect their human rights and be compliant with that law, even if the Equality Bill could write out that one did not have to be compliant, if there was not to be regression how can you allow exceptions on grounds of gender reassignment even where people have a Gender Recognition Certificate? I do not think we raised this in Committee so it is a new human rights based point.
Vera Baird: What are the specific exceptions that you are worried about?
Q74 Dr Harris: For example, in Schedule 9 there is the ability of a religious organisation to discriminate, so they could say, "We will allow a woman priest", that is if they had women priests ---
Vera Baird: There are not many of them.
Q75 Dr Harris: Yes, indeed, but let us say they did, "But we are not going to allow a woman priest who is in possession of a Gender Recognition Certificate, who is a woman". They would argue that is a permitted exception under gender reassignment. Is that a clash with the sex discrimination provisions?
Vera Baird: Is that right? She is a woman now for all purposes, not a transgender person, a woman.
Q76 Dr Harris:
Right.
Vera Baird: That is the point of the certificate, is it not, to make it clear beyond doubt and that is where all her rights come from.
Q77 Dr Harris:
So what you are saying is someone with a certificate does not fall within the protected ground and, therefore, exceptions on that protected ground ---
Vera Baird: Will fall within the protected ground of sex.
Chairman: I think you have answered the question.


The intent of the EqA was to say that trans women are women for all purposes as per the GRA. The available protection of gender reassignment applies only on discrimination due to perception of it, and that is a protection available to cis people too.

* not ''grasping at straws'' - a clear statement of the intent of the purpose of the Bill from the Solicitor General.
 
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