The judgement says they looked for any legislation that might have found the policy of access to be lawful - workplace regs, Equality Act, and human rights - they found nothing in them that would make access lawful.
Two tests? Tests for what? The tribunal was looking at a specific policy within the wider TIW policy. It wasn't lawful. Anything else is your desperate spin.
You simply seek to muddy the waters re the legality of male access to women's spaces.
Your readings are too simple. The Equality Act contains no positive right for a transgender woman to be in a women's changing room, does not contain a positive duty to oblige a transgender to use a women's changing room, pr explicitly ban either trans people or transgender people from spaces. As I said before, the law (meaning the EqA) is silent. Other human rights law is silent on this. Accordingly the tribunal has used the 1992 Workplace Regulations - later amended - to make their finding.
The arguments on these threads has being going back some years. In some cases what was being correctly argued at that time may have been superseded, so that should be kept in mind.
You've argued with me before when I have drawn the legal distinction between a transgender woman and a trans woman. This is never ''magical thinking' to quote you, and all the time the GRA exists in its current form, the distinction remains.
You should remember that I have always argued this from the legal perspective only. In relation to the three recent cases, Peggie, Kelly and Darlington, none have been brought on the presence of a trans woman (a person with the birth certificate of that of a woman).
In the Peggie case, Dr Beth Upton had not acquired a GRC at the time of the complaint, and therefore was legally male.
In the Kelly case, no transgender or trans person was at the centre of the case - it was a challenge to the policy on a hypothetical.
In Darlington nurses, Rose Henderson was at the time of the complaint a transgender woman who towards the end of the saga was at the stage of commencing hormone treatment, therefore legally male.
My criticism of the wording of the judgment is that the two terms 'transgender woman' and 'trans woman' were conflated as if to give the same legal meaning. This is not me saying that would have the effect of changing the judgment in this case.
It would be helpful if you answered my hypothetical question about choosing one of three doors. This is only to seek a lawful and practical way of accommodating all people according to the legal identity and needs, and not to ask you private information. Shouldn't this be a joint aim of all people - an end to this dispute?