Gender again. Sorry!

[monkers]

Negative rights is irrelevant and nothing to do with the claim you have been asked to back up.

Principle of residual liberty.

The UK legal system is based on the principle that individuals are free to act unless their conduct is restricted by law. In other words, rights are generally negative in form: conduct is permitted unless a statutory provision or a rule of common law prohibits it.

The Equality Act 2010 does not create a positive obligation to act in the way you suggest. However, in the absence of any statutory or common‑law prohibition, the conduct in question remains lawful. That is precisely what the judge determined.

Put simply, the court found that there is no legal rule preventing the conduct, and therefore the law is effectively silent on the point.

 

[Ianonabike]

Rose Henderson was not a party to the proceedings, so would not be unable to appeal. Only the parties to the case could appeal a finding

I realised that later, but didn't correct myself as I wanted to see if anyone was paying attention.*


*That's my story and I'm sticking with it.

 

[monkers]

The policy that allowed him to use women's facilities was unlawful under the Equality Act. And in fact the judge could find no other law that did give him right of access. Nobody has claimed he was committing a criminal offence if that's going to be your next pivot btw.

View attachment 12337


This is your usual attempt to sow confusion about what a judgement says in order to leave the door open for trans identifying men to use women's spaces.

See my reply above to Spen. That there is no positive right means that the EqA gave no right to Rose, but also that no restriction to be found elsewhere, effectively the law is silent on the matter. However, read on ...

The judgment is therefore found on the substance of fact found under the 1992 Workplace Regulations (not the EqA).

The judgment has the effect of agreeing with your earlier assertions. Previously, and without taking the trouble to quote you -nonetheless you will recognise yourself - that the presence of Rose had the effect of creating a mixed sex changing room. Therefore the Darlington nurses who wished to change in a women only or private space lacked that facility. That was the failure in implementation of the policy.

The judge also noticed and acknowledged those women in evidence who said that they are not comfortable stripping to underwear in front of other women, and that no private changing space was available to them. This may also be considered a failure of provision under reasonable adjustments in the 1992 workplace provisions for those women.

The judgment does not say that a policy can not include a mixed sex changing facility, but that the employer must also provide for those who don't wish to use them.

The judge referred to the inclusion policy in the following way ''We observe this is an admirable and noble purpose.'' The failure was to provide for the Darlington nurses and for those other women who had no access to a private changing room(s).

 

[monkers]

The policy that allowed him to use women's facilities was unlawful under the Equality Act. And in fact the judge could find no other law that did give him right of access. Nobody has claimed he was committing a criminal offence if that's going to be your next pivot btw.

View attachment 12337


This is your usual attempt to sow confusion about what a judgement says in order to leave the door open for trans identifying men to use women's spaces.

It isn't, I've clearly told you that the judgment agrees with your earlier assertion, just that the judge says the justification for your view is not found in the EqA but within Workplace Regualations. If you want the exact location, you'll need to rely on my memory, but it is something like ACOP Section 24 paragraphs 245 and onwards.

 

[AuroraSaab]

The judge said the reading of 'man' and 'woman' in the Workplace regs must logically be the same as in the Equality Act, ie biological. You seem to be imagining that somehow this case means the Equality Act cannot be relied on alone in future cases to ensure single sex provision. I doubt that will be the case. You're just trying to sow confusion (....or look for crumbs of comfort).

 

[monkers]

The judge said the reading of 'man' and 'woman' in the Workplace regs must logically be the same as in the Equality Act, ie biological. You seem to be imagining that somehow this case means the Equality Act cannot be relied on alone in future cases to ensure single sex provision. I doubt that will be the case. You're just trying to sow confusion (....or look for crumbs of comfort).

Hypothetical question, if you came across a wall with three doors marked as follows, women only changing, men only changing, communal changing, and you wished to change, would you feel catered for?

 

[Bromptonaut]

Reading my way through the ET decision. Hard work as the early paragraphs are a blow by blow broadly chronological account of how events developed. It's also notable that at least one of the claimants was advised by the Christian Legal Centre - always an alarm call to my mind.

As in the Peggie case it's got a number of formatting oddities and at least one case where a word is omitted in circs where proper proofing should have sorted it.

It's a first instance decision and, as you'd expect very much stands on its particular facts.

The presence of questions about whether Rose was transitioning at all, had stopped hormones and the fact they were, or were believed to be, in a sexually functioning relationship with a woman and trying for a baby with them were clearly to the fore.

Even as somebody who is firmly on the trans women are women side of the fence I'd be scratching my head a bit at that point.

 

[spen666]

See my reply above to Spen. That there is no positive right means that the EqA gave no right to Rose, but also that no restriction to be found elsewhere, effectively the law is silent on the matter. However, read on ...

The judgment is therefore found on the substance of fact found under the 1992 Workplace Regulations (not the EqA).

The judgment has the effect of agreeing with your earlier assertions. Previously, and without taking the trouble to quote you -nonetheless you will recognise yourself - that the presence of Rose had the effect of creating a mixed sex changing room. Therefore the Darlington nurses who wished to change in a women only or private space lacked that facility. That was the failure in implementation of the policy.

The judge also noticed and acknowledged those women in evidence who said that they are not comfortable stripping to underwear in front of other women, and that no private changing space was available to them. This may also be considered a failure of provision under reasonable adjustments in the 1992 workplace provisions for those women.

The judgment does not say that a policy can not include a mixed sex changing facility, but that the employer must also provide for those who don't wish to use them.

The judge referred to the inclusion policy in the following way ''We observe this is an admirable and noble purpose.'' The failure was to provide for the Darlington nurses and for those other women who had no access to a private changing room(s).

Lots more words salad but still not a single thing to vack up your claim the NHS Trust was found to be lawful.


You made the claim, and all i am asking you is where it is in the judgement.

Your answer whilst wrong, actually is evidence the court did not find the policy lawful as you are saying it did not make a ruling no.

Thud well done you have proven that point

 

[monkers]

Lots more words salad but still not a single thing to vack up your claim the NHS Trust was found to be lawful.

This is not something I said. Another case of not reading the post, or invention. The tribunal found against the NHS Trust.

Happy now?

 

[Bromptonaut]

Lots more words salad but still not a single thing to vack up your claim the NHS Trust was found to be lawful.


You made the claim, and all i am asking you is where it is in the judgement.

Your answer whilst wrong, actually is evidence the court did not find the policy lawful as you are saying it did not make a ruling no.

Thud well done you have proven that point

Are you saying the Tribunal found the policy unlawful?

 

[Bromptonaut]

I'm working my way through the decision as published on the Judiciary website but finding it needs to be taken in bitesize chunks; so far I'm at para 154.

Once upon a time, when Dagenham still made Cortinas, I was clerk to a member of a different judicial Tribunal. If I'd let a document as badly formatted and, if not error strewn then certainly not error free, in the public domain I'd have had a 'no tea and biscuits' chat, me stood to as near attention as civies do, with the Tribunal President and the Registrar.

What on Alex Ferguson's watch would be a hair dryer meeting.

 

[spen666]

Are you saying the Tribunal found the policy unlawful?

I'm asking Monkers to point ot the paragraph(s) of the judgement where they saysit found the policy was lawful.
I'm saying nothing as I have not been able to establish where the tribunal made such a finding

I'm not even sure what policy it was that Monkers claims was found to be lawful as they have not been able to point me to the paragraph declaring any policy to be lawful

 

[monkers]

I'm asking Monkers to point ot the paragraph(s) of the judgement where they saysit found the policy was lawful.
I'm saying nothing as I have not been able to establish where the tribunal made such a finding

I'm not even sure what policy it was that Monkers claims was found to be lawful as they have not been able to point me to the paragraph declaring any policy to be lawful

The tribunal found that ...

The policy was commended for pursuing a legitimate aim for inclusion under the EqA, therefore not unlawful in that respect.

The implementation of the policy had the effect of contravening the Workplace Regulation, therefore unlawful in that respect.

The conduct of managers with regard to the complainants was found to be unlawful and led to a finding of indirect discrimination under the EqA, therefore unlawful.

Rose was not a respondent, yet her conduct was an ongoing feature of the case with the outcome that the tribunal found no criticism of her conduct.